Previously implemented both as a standard regulatory intervention and key antitrust remedy in network industries, structural separations have been largely abandoned. Separations regimes limit the lines of business in which a firm can engage, either by proscribing entry in certain markets or by requiring that distinct lines of business be operated through separate affiliates. This Article argues that the potential hazards of integration by dominant tech platforms invite recovering structural separations. This structure places dominant platforms in direct competition with some of the businesses that depend on them, creating a conflict of interest that platforms can exploit to further entrench their dominance, thwart competition, and stifle innovation. One feature dominant digital platforms share is that they have integrated across business lines such that they both operate a platform and market their own goods and services on it.
By structuring access to markets, these firms function as gatekeepers for billions of dollars in economic activity.
A handful of digital platforms mediate a growing share of online commerce and communications.
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